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Abstract: A new fatwa was announced by the British National Health Service (NHS) in June 2019 to 
clarify the Islamic position on organ donation. Additionally, the NHS promotional material presents 
brief arguments for and against organ donation in Islam. However, to date, research into the various 
fatwas on organ donation is required. This article goes beyond the dichotomous positions mentioned 
by the NHS and goes on to explore and summarise seven conflicting views on the issue extrapolated 
from an exhaustive reading of fatwas and research papers in various languages since 1925. Our 
discussion is circumscribed to allotransplant and confined to the gifting of organs to legally 
competent adult donors at the time of consent. These arguments include an analysis of the semantic 
portrayal of ownership in the Qur’an; considering the net benefit over the gross harm involved in 
organ donation; balancing the rights of the human body with the application of the rule of necessity; 
understanding the difference between anthropophagy and organ transplantation; understanding of 
death, and the conceptualisation of the soul. We argue that, given the absence of clear-cut direction 
from Muslim scripture, all seven positions are Islamic positions and people are at liberty to adopt 
any one position without theological guilt or moral culpability. 
Keywords: organ donation; organ transplant; fatwa; muftī; ownership; brain death; soul; Islamic 
law; NHS; rūh 
 
1. Introduction 
In June 2019, the British National Health Service (NHS) announced a new independent legal 
opinion (henceforth fatwa) clarifying the Islamic position on organ donation (NHSBT 2019). The fatwa 
was published in the wake of ‘The Organ Donation (Deemed consent) Act 2019′ receiving royal assent 
in March 2019 and scheduled to become law in April 2020 (Department of Health and Social Care 
2019). The imminent change in law from express consent to an ‘opt-out’ system where consent is 
deemed to be the default position set off a flurry of action and campaigns in the Muslim community. 
Organisations such as the British Islamic Medical Association (BIMA) with funding from the NHS 
Blood and Transplant service managed to run numerous workshops and webinars promoting organ 
donation in the Muslim community (BIMA 2019). On the other hand, there was a pushback from 
some quarters of the Muslim community accusing the government of meddling in Muslim affairs 
(Master 2019). 
To provide potential Muslim donors with a choice, the NHS promotional material presents brief 
arguments for and against organ donation in Islam. What is the correct Islamic position on organ 
transplantation? Why are some Muslims campaigning in support of organ donation while others 
oppose it? In this article, we go beyond the two positions mentioned by the NHS and explore seven 
conflicting views on the issue. We demonstrate that the Islamic discussion on organ transplantation 
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is highly technical and multi-faceted. The evidence provided for and against it is simultaneously 
opaque and porous, giving rise to a multitude of understandings. We posit that all seven positions 
are valid Islamic positions, expanding the range of choices hitherto offered by the NHS. We 
recommend that people consult with their families, imams, chaplains, doctors and significant others 
to arrive at a theologically informed decision about donating their organs, and the organs of their 
loved ones. 
2. Methodology and Scope of the Article 
The positions mentioned in this article were gleaned from an exhaustive reading of fatwas and 
research papers in Arabic, Urdu, and English. The initial search was conducted by inputting key 
words related to organ transplantation into the ‘Islamic Medical and Scientific Ethics Database’ (IMSE 
Project), a collaborative effort between two Georgetown Libraries, the Bioethics Research Library 
(Washington DC) and the Georgetown University Qatar Library (Doha) (Shabana et al. 2009). Certain 
Qur’anic concepts such as ‘milkiyya’, ‘rūḥ’ and ‘nafs’ were analysed using the ArabiCorpus tool, which 
was developed by Professor Dil Parkinson of Brigham Young University. The tool consists of over 
174 million Arabic words—of which, 77% are from newspapers, 28 million words from non-fiction 
literature, 9 million words from premodern literature and 1 million words of modern literature 
(Parkinson 2013). In explicating the seven positions, we sufficed with analysing the major arguments 
for each position as a detailed analysis of all arguments will surpass the word count limit of this 
article. Moreover, our discussion is circumscribed to allotransplant, i.e., receiving from and donating 
to another human being. Autotransplant, xenotransplant, and donation for medical research are not 
the focus of this article as these transplantations come with another set of ethical issues not discussed 
here (see Padela and Duivenbode 2018 for some of these issues). 
In conducting our research, we have upheld certain conventions without challenging them. 
Thus, our discussion on live organ donation is confined to the gifting of non-vital organs, as there is 
a consensus on the impermissibility of donating vital organs by a living person (IFC 2003; IIFA 1988).1 
Additionally, we automatically excluded the issue of donating male and female reproductive glands 
from both living and cadaver donors from our discussion; its impermissibility has not been 
challenged by anyone (Albar 1994). However, we do not exclude womb transplantation since some 
scholars have conditionally permitted it (for transplantation into women only) arguing that the womb 
has no influence in the genetic makeup of a child (Shawqī 2018b). With respect to donor types, we 
have focused on adult donors who were legally competent at the time of consent. The arguments in 
this article do not extend to the minor or the legally incompetent person as there are complicated 
ethical issues associated with them; a discussion, which is beyond the scope of this article. Finally, 
there are other peripheral issues associated with organ transplantation including directed organ 
donation, inter-faith organ donation, the status of organs of criminals, the issue of consent and 
deemed consent and the ethics of organ reception (see Rispler-Chaim and Duguet 2018). These will 
be discussed in subsequent articles. 
3. Preliminary Remarks 
Before delving into the different positions on organ transplantation, some remarks on the Islamic 
sources employed in this discussion are in order. Organ transplantation is an issue that is conspicuous 
by its absence in Muslim scripture. Scholars discussing the topic creatively entertain what God would 
have wanted had He pronounced on the subject. The starting point of all discussions is silence. 
Scripture is drawn upon to explain related abstract topics such as ownership of the body (Sachedina 
2011, p. 176), human dignity and prohibition of mutilation (Ebrahim 1995, pp. 292–93; Sachedina 
2011). These are abstract concepts which can be argued for either way depending on who is 
                                                 
 
1 IFC: Islamic Fiqh Council (of Mecca), Majmaʿ al-Fiqhī al-Islamī; IIFA: International Islamic Fiqh Academy (of 
Jeddah), Majmaʿ al-Fiqh al-Islamī al-Duwalī.  
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interpreting them. Thus, the discussion on organ transplantation falls within the domain of ‘legal 
discretion’ (ijtihād) (Moosa 1998, p. 293), which is the reason why there is a plurality of opinions. 
A fatwa is the product of ijtihād, which is a non-binding legal opinion provided by a specialist 
trained in Islamic law known as a muftī. Given the complex nature of technology and specialised 
knowledge, current practice in the Muslim world is to hold conferences, which bring together a group 
of specialists including muftīs, medical doctors, lawyers and other professionals depending on the 
nature of the conference. The collective deliberations at such conferences lead to the birth of a novel 
mode of reasoning and a new way of arriving at religious verdicts known as ijtihād jamāʿī (collective 
legal reasoning) (Caeiro 2017; ʿAbdullāh 2010; Ghaly 2012a; IFC 2004). The resolutions arrived at 
these conferences have more legal force than the fatwa of a lone muftī since government legislatures 
are present at those conferences. For example, the resolution passed by the International Islamic Fiqh 
Academy of Jeddah (IIFA) in 1988 led to the Saudi Government adopting it as their official position 
on organ transplantation. Ali AlBar writes in his exhaustive study on organ transplantation that as a 
result of this law, for the period up to 1991, Saudi Arabia saw 823 successful kidney transplants—352 
of which were procured from patients whose deaths were determined using neurological criteria and 
471 donations from living family members (Albar 1994). 
The first Muslim discussion on organ transplantation at our disposal is by the Saudi scholar 
ʿAbd al-Raḥmān al-Saʿdī (d. 1965) and dates back to 1925. Al-Saʿdī stages his discussion as a debate 
between opponents and proponents of organ transplantation without mentioning which side he is 
on. Nevertheless, it is not difficult to distil his position from the article. The Saudi bioethicist, 
Abdullah Aljoudi, in preparation for presenting his research as a poster to the Harvard bioethics 
conference 2018 quantified al-Saʿdī’s fatwa. Aljoudi observes that out of the 1,476 words of the article, 
al-Saʿdī utilises 22.6% of the words describing the prohibition position; the bulk of his article (56.9%) 
is used to simultaneously respond to the opponents of organ transplantation as well as arguing in its 
favour (Aljoudi 2018). Interestingly, al-Saʿdī’s discussion focuses on blood transfusion and corneal 
transplants. This focus is understandable given the state of transplant medicine during al-Saʿdī’s 
time. 
The early part of the 20th century saw a shift in the world of organ transplantation. Al-Saʿdī’s 
context for his discussion originated before major breakthroughs were discovered. Thus, he provides 
a more generic guideline, which places trust in medical professionals and strongly encourages jurists 
and medical experts to collaborate on the matter. The discussion also highlights that as the medical 
field advances, what may once have been prohibited due to harm, may be permitted due to greater 
potential benefits (Maravia 2019). 
Innovation in medical treatment is viewed positively by al-Saʿdī. Accordingly, the benefits of 
transplantation to patients are expected to outweigh the harms brought to the donor. Al-Saʿdī’s faith 
in the medical field may have been solidified by the two decades of successful corneal transplants 
since 1906 as well as the effective use of defibrillators in Europe. Likewise, consequent decades 
discovered tissue typing and immunosuppressant drugs in the 1970s to ensure more effective 
treatments. Al-Saʿdī, therefore, appears to have envisioned the trajectory of medical breakthroughs 
rather than fear the possible harms on living donors (Maravia 2019). 
Earlier discussions and fatwas on organ transplantation focus primarily on individual organs 
and tissues rather than providing a fatwa for the entire body. The earliest discussions focused on 
blood transfusion (Al-Saʿdī [1925] 2011; Makhlūf 1951; Maʾmūn 1959a), followed by cornea tissue 
(Maʾmūn 1959b; Al-Harīdī 1966) and skin graft (Al-Khāṭir 1973). Only in the late 1960s did a general 
discussion on organ transplantation took place rather than individual organs (Shafīʿ [1967] 2010; Gād 
al-Haq 1979). Recent fatwas on organ transplantation delve into novel and non-routine transplants 
such as womb transplant (Shawqī 2018b) and mitochondria DNA transplant (Shawqī 2018a). Despite 
the different foci of these fatwas and discussions, nearly all of them display the same concerns. 
What can be gleaned from an exhaustive reading of these fatwas and discussions is that the 
following topics fare quite highly in them: 
1. God’s ownership of the human body, 
2. Human dignity, 
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3. Necessity, 
4. Altruism and charity, 
5. Benefit and harm, and 
6. A watertight definition of death. 
Our research has revealed that there are seven main opinions on organ transplantation in 
addition to some minor variations of these opinions. Below, we present these seven opinions; for each 
position, we provide the names of some advocates, its major arguments and response to those 
arguments. We use a considerable amount of space engaging with positions one and two as 
subsequent positions draw from the same pool of resources as these two. 
4. Position 1: Organ Reception and Donation are both Forbidden 
The first position can be deemed as the default position on how a human being should be treated 
as far as bodily integrity is concerned (see Rashid 2018). Proponents of this position argue that the 
human body should be left naturally intact as far as possible without any invasive intervention. This 
belief stems from the Islamic understanding of the ‘primordial natural state’ (fiṭra) enshrined in the 
verse of the Qur’an ‘This is the natural disposition God instilled in mankind– there is no altering 
God’s creation,’ (Q. 30:30).2 For proponents of this position, organ transplantation in both iterations: 
reception and donation are prohibited. This opinion was held by Muh ̣ammad Shafīʿ (d. 1976), former 
chief muftī of Darul Uloom Deoband India (Shafīʿ [1967] 2010), Akhtar Rezā Khān (d. 2018) (Khān 
1991), Muḥammad Mitwallī Al-Shaʿrāwī (d. 1998) (Al-Shaʿrāwī 1987), ʿAbdullāh Ṣiddīq al-Ghumārī 
(d. 1993) (2007) and ʿAbd al-Salām ʿAbd al-Raḥīm Al-Sukkarī (1988) to name a few. These scholars 
resort to four types of sources to argue their position: (1) scripture, (2) classical Islamic law, (3) society 
and (4) culture. 
Two main arguments are made by invoking scripture: (1) God’s ownership of the human body 
and (2) human dignity. The Qur’an clearly places the sovereignty of everything within God’s domain, 
‘Exalted is He who holds all control in His hands; who has power over all things.’ (Q. 67:1). The 
Qur’an further singles out human beings as the property of God, ‘Say, ‘I seek refuge with the Lord of 
people, the Master of people, the God of people.’ (Q. 114:1-3). From such verses, it has been inferred 
that God is the true owner and master of the human body while humans act as mere stewards and 
agents for it. Stewardship implies that humans do not have unlimited freedom over their bodies 
(Sachedina 2011, p. 176). This freedom has to be bridled with accountability and responsibility which 
includes a fair-use policy. 
4.1. The Ownership Argument 
By using the above verses as a springboard, scholars from this camp develop rational arguments 
to prove that organ transplantation is impermissible. The argument is that true ownership of a thing 
means that one has complete control and discretionary right over that thing. Once the definition is 
established, the next question is whether it applies to human beings vis-à-vis their organs and limbs. 
To test this definition, scholars employ the case of voluntary and involuntary movements in the 
human body. Bakrū posits that there are certain movements and functions in the human body which 
are out of a person’s control such as breathing, flowing of blood and vital fluids, and bowel 
movements (Bakrū 1992, p. 201). Furthermore, even voluntary movements are predicated on God 
willing them to move, without which a person is not able to move an inch. By employing biological 
and theological reasonings, Bakrū concludes that since human beings fall short of the definition of 
ownership vis-à-vis their bodies, they do not have the right to transact with it. 
Numerous responses have been given to the ownership argument. Firstly, a corpus-based 
analysis of the Arabic verb ‘yamlik’ (to own) and its derivatives from the Qur’an reveal that, contrary 
                                                 
 
2 All Qur’an translations in this article has been taken from Haleem, M. A. Abdel. (Haleem 2005). The Qur’an. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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to Bakrū, one does not need to have full control over a thing to own it. A frequency search of the verb 
‘yamlik’ and its derivatives using the ArabiCorpus tool reveals that the verb ‘yamlik’ and its associate 
words denote owning the concrete such as wealth, as well as having the abstract such as right or 
ability. Moreover, in the Qur’an, collocates of ‘yamlik’ and its variant forms—mālik and malik—portray 
a distinction whereby humans are owners whereas statues and structures cannot own even a qitmīr, 
which is the membrane of a date seed (Q. 35:13). The verse implies that humans are owners of various 
goods in life. On the other hand, God reserves complete control over mostly abstract concepts such 
as sustenance, benefit, harm, life and death. 
The collocation analysis reveals that the Qur’an clearly accepts humans as being owners and 
possessors of material substances but makes humans conscious of the fact that they are not in absolute 
control. Thus, the semantic portrayal of ownership (milkiyya) in the Qur’an is antithetical to Bakrū’s 
notion of one not being able to own what one has no control over. Rather, the very fact that one is not 
in control is the aim of the Qur’anic message while establishing that humans have been allowed 
ownership. This ownership extends to things that God created Himself including slaves, a concurrent 
issue during the time of revelation. 
The fact that slavery was tolerated in Islam through Qur’anic sanction and the Prophetic 
mandate is one of the strongest defences against the ownership argument. Islam did not institute 
slavery, but it certainly did not abolish it, although emancipation was seen as a highly recommended 
act of worship (Brown 2019). Clarification is required that the point of this rebuttal is to demonstrate 
that the ownership argument is not consistent and should not be construed as an argument for the 
return of slavery. 
Secondly, some have questioned whether the ownership argument really has any legal basis. 
The former grand muftī of Lebanon, Muḥammad Rashīd Qabbānī, argues that to explore the issue 
from the angle of ownership is incorrect as no one disputes this fact (Qabbānī 2003). Qabbānī 
maintains that the issue needs to be tackled from the point of view of discretionary rights and not 
ownership. By employing the rights argument, one is able to arrive at a decision on the extent of 
discretion that humans have over their bodies. Qabbānī maintains that the human body is a site 
where both God and humans share a claim on it and people’s right over their bodies is privileged 
over God’s right. While Qabbānī’s argument does not neatly establish the permissibility of organ 
transplantation and donation, he manages to create a space to discuss bioethical issues related to the 
human body without having to discuss the ownership question (for a detailed commentary and 
translation of Qabbānī’s discussion see Ali 2019b). 
For the Qatar-based Egyptian scholar, Yūsuf al-Qarad ̣āwī, human organs and limbs are similar 
to wealth, since both of them have been given to humans by God, and therefore fall under the same 
ruling related to wealth. The only difference is that the restriction to donate organs is slightly stricter 
than donating wealth (Al-Qarad ̣āwī 2009). Al-Qaradạ̄wī’s reading of the Prophetic statement ‘Every 
good is charity (ṣadaqa)’ goes beyond financial help and extends to any form of the ‘good’—one 
example of which is organ donation. 
Finally, the ownership argument fails in the case of blood transfusion. With the exception of 
Khān, all other proponents acknowledge that blood transfusion is permissible. This contradiction is 
a methodological flaw in their argument, since blood, albeit regenerative, nevertheless is a part of the 
human body, which according to their argument should be forbidden since one does not have 
complete control over their own blood. These scholars respond that the permissibility of blood 
transfusion is based on the issue of selling human milk which is permissible. This argument is 
problematic from numerous angles. First of all, it contradicts the original argument about control as 
a basis for the prohibition of organ transplantation. Secondly, blood is categorically mentioned as one 
of the forbidden and impure substances in the Qur’an which these scholars believe does not have any 
curative value. Despite this notion, these scholars allow transfusion whereas they do not allow organ 
transplantation about which the scripture is silent (Moosa 1998). Finally, the analogy with milk is an 
incorrect one as the former is permissible and pure, while the latter is impermissible and impure. 
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4.2. The Dignity Argument 
Stemming from the argument that the human body is a trust from God, who is the true owner 
of the body, is the issue of human dignity (karāma and ḥurma). Organ transplantation violates this 
dignity and therefore it is impermissible. The Qur’an in numerous verses mentions that God has 
dignified and honoured the human being (Q. 17:70). Violation of this dignity is measured in two 
ways: (1) degradation (ihāna) and (2) mutilation (muthlā). While retrieving organs, which prolongs 
the funeral is not in and of itself mutilation, however, since it prolongs what naturally should be done 
(i.e., burial), it is deemed to be an infraction of that dignity (Krawietz 2003). Furthermore, viewing 
the dying or dead person as a potential repository for organs relegates the value of the human to that 
of a means to an end. 
The degradation (ihāna) intensifies when physical intervention into the body is involved. Any 
form of incision into the human body, dead or alive, without it having any physical benefit to the 
donor (iṣlāḥ al-badan) is deemed mutilation. By way of evidence, a conversation in the Qur’an between 
God and Satan regarding how the latter will lead people astray is presented. According to Qur’an 
4:119, Satan announces to God that one of his major ploys to lead people astray from God’s way is by 
seducing them to mutilate and change the creation of God. The above verse, coupled with a Prophetic 
statement, ‘breaking the bones of the dead is like breaking the bones of the living,’ is the final nail in 
the coffin against organ transplantation (Ibn Mājah, bāb fī al-nahyy fī kasr ʿiz ̣̄am al-mayyit, cited in Al-
Bassām 2003). For the proponents of the first position, organ transplantation is an evil anticipated by 
the Prophet and an instantiation of the self-fulfilling prophecy of the devil. 
Scholars have responded that while the Qur’an declares that humans have dignity and are 
honoured, it has not laid down concrete guidance as to how this dignity is to be actualised. Therefore, 
it is left on society to decide how to define dignity (Raḥmānī 2010; Butt 2019). Al-Bassām (d. 2002) 
mentions that mutilation (muthlā) has a specific understanding in Arabic relating particularly to the 
context of war. Mutilation in Arabia was used as a form of weapon employed to cause hurt to the 
living by desecrating their loved ones. Malignant intention is a prerequisite of mutilation. Al-Bassām 
argues that this understanding of mutilation cannot be transposed on to precise surgery carried out 
in a clinically sterile environment at the hands of a qualified surgeon for the sole purpose of saving 
someone else’s life (Al-Bassām 2003). Furthermore, he argues that to deem organ transplantation as 
an example of the actualisation of Satan’s prophecy is misplaced and an incorrect stretching of the 
meaning of the verse. Thus, a close reading of the Qur’an reveals that mutilation in this context relates 
to certain occult practices involving cutting off of animal organs (especially the male-born of the five-
year-old camel) to ward off evil from the rest of the flock (Al-Bassām 2003, p. 40). 
4.3. Organ Transplantation in Secondary Literature 
In addition to using generic verses regarding God’s ownership and human dignity from Muslim 
scriptures, scholars of the first position draw upon the Islamic legal literature which includes both 
abstract legal maxims (al-qawāʿid al-fiqhiyya) as well as legal precedents (furūʿ al-fiqh) in order to fortify 
their position. Legal maxims are a set of principles derived from scripture to which legal scholars 
(henceforth, fuqahāʾ) resort to in new arising situations in the absence of firm textual evidence (Rabb 
2010). The maxims are an eclectic mix of categorical moral imperatives and utilitarian statements. 
Some of the legal maxims employed by advocates of the first position include (1) Harm is not to be 
removed by another harm, (2) harm is not to be removed by similar harm, and (3) that which one 
cannot sell, cannot be gifted (Al-Shinqīṭī 1994, p. 365). 
These legal maxims are abstract guiding principles that do not fit neatly with the issue at hand. 
For example, the first maxim can easily be challenged by questioning (in the case of cadaver donation) 
whether any harm is inflicted on the donor. Moreover, should not the ‘net benefit’ of a transplant be 
considered over the ‘gross harm’ (if any) involved in the procedure? More will be said about this 
further down. The abstract nature of the legal maxims makes them harder to pin down neatly to any 
given case as opposed to legal precedents. Advocates of the first position are on more solid ground 
when they employ these precedent cases from the legal literature (furūʿ al-fiqh). 
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The precedent cases allow scholars to extend them to the ruling of organ transplantation by way 
of analogy (qiyās). A benefit in using this method is that it is based on precedents set by previous 
scholars; contemporary scholars are in good company as they do not need to venture into unchartered 
territory. However, a problem with this approach is that, in their zeal to veer closely to a text as far 
as possible, scholars may infer wrong analogical reasoning from the precedents resulting in an 
incorrect legal ruling for the issue at hand. Two precedent cases presented by the advocates will be 
explored here. The human dignity argument established from the Qur’an demands that human 
beings are not a means to an end. Based on this Qur’anic command, the medieval fuqahāʾ declared 
any therapeutic use of human teeth, hair and bones to be forbidden except for the owner of these 
items (Nizām al-Dīn 1991). The Syrian scholar al-Būṭī (d. 2013) argues that the examples adduced in 
the medieval law books relate to cosmetic enhancement of the human (taḥsīn) and is not to be 
confused with modern invasive life-saving technology which falls under the degree of necessity 
(ḍarūra). Islam allows such exceptions to the laws in the case of necessity only (Nyazee 2016, p. 185). 
Al-Būṭī explains that the examples are correct in that no one argues for the use of human remains for 
cosmetic enhancement, but they are not accurate legal precedents for organ transplantation (Al-Būṭī 
1988). The ḍarūra argument has been labelled as the ‘breaker of all rules’ argument (Brown 1999). 
However, one can question whether the relaxing of a Shariah law in the presence of necessity is 
absolute? Are there situations where the necessity rule does not apply? 
4.4. Cannibalism and Anthropophagy 
Proponents of the first position believe that the ‘necessity’ rule should not be used recklessly. 
The rule fails in circumstances like the consumption of human flesh (anthropophagy) in times of dire 
necessity such as in a famine where no other source of food is available. The logic of using this 
argument is that if it can be established that consuming human flesh is permissible in dire necessity, 
which is the ultimate aggression inflicted on the human body, then organ procurement will be a 
fortiori permissible. However, medieval Muslim scholars were not unanimous on the issue of 
anthropophagy which led to contemporary scholars dually employing it to prove contradictory 
opinions. Shafīʿ and his colleagues from the Indian sub-continent stuck to the position of the Ḥanafī 
school of law which argues that any form of anthropophagy is forbidden even in a life-threatening 
situation. Others accept the position of the Shāfiʿī school of thought, which is the most lenient on this 
issue. Al-Būṭī argues that the Shāfiʿī permissibility of anthropophagy is in line with the broader 
objective of the Shariah (maqāṣid al-sharīʿah). 
The anthropophagy argument features early on in the organ transplantation debate (Shafīʿ 
[1967] 2010). However, one may ask whether the analogy between consuming human flesh and 
procuring and transplanting an organ is correct and symmetrical? Can there be any parity between 
eating human flesh and transplanting human organs? In the case of the former, it is most likely that 
the person is found dead; his flesh is consumed, gnashed with the teeth, swallowed, digested and 
excreted. Anthropophagy is in stark contrast to removing an organ in a sterile environment at the 
hands of professional surgeons and then equally transplanted into a recipient, taking every care not 
to harm or perforate the organ in any way that renders it useless. The image that is conjured up by 
the first scenario is bloody and brutal; an image that vividly depicts mutilation in every sense of the 
word. One needs to ask whether the same revolting thoughts are conjured in the mind when talking 
about organ transplantation. 
4.5. Social Ills 
Organ transplantation is more or less accepted throughout the world as an effective life-saving 
technology. Why then are the scholars from the first position so adamant to forbid it? Are they against 
the saving of life, which is a religious imperative? In addition to viewing the act of procuring, 
donating and transplanting an organ as a violation of religious sensibilities established from scripture 
and Islamic law, these scholars were wary of the negative effect that their fatwas will have on their 
society. There is a genuine fear on their part that in the absence of government-supported transplant 
programs in Muslim countries, fatwas on the permissibility of organ donation will legitimise the 
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demand for organ harvesting—the supply of which will most likely come through illegal organ 
trafficking and black market organ trade (Shafīʿ [1967] 2010, pp. 55–59). Pakistan, during the time 
Shafī wrote his fatwa, had no government-supported organ transplantation programme. Moazam 
maintains that transplantation is still being carried out in private transplantation centres—one of 
which was her fieldwork site (Moazam 2006). 
Exploitation of the weak and poor for health tourism reasons is a common problem in third-
world countries. The public in Egypt was already aware of numerous scandals involving organ 
transplantation. The televangelical cleric, al-Shaʿrāwī, did not bring them anything new when he 
campaigned against organ transplantation. For the Egyptian people, al-Shaʿrāwī’s fiery brimstone 
preaching confirmed their anxiety and suspicion regarding the efficacy of organ transplantation. 
Farmers in Egypt already faced the repercussion of consuming crops treated with pesticides by 
government contractors in the form of mass renal failure. Furthermore, stories of children kidnapped 
from orphanages to service organ tourists, and missing eyeballs of dead relatives preserved in state 
hospitals left a very bitter taste in their mouths (Hamdy 2012). 
Concomitant with the exploitation argument, some scholars are worried that allowing organ 
transplantation will lead to a slippery slope practice resulting in the complete annihilation of the 
human (corpse). In Islamic legal theory, such an argument is known as ‘blocking the means’ (sadd al-
dharāʾiʿ), which tends to look at the future rather than the present. Shams Pīrzādah from the Indian 
Fiqh Academy argues that allowing organ transplantation will set off a conveyor belt motion which 
starts with organ donation, leading to organ transaction, emerging into doctors using human bones 
and skin to make medicine and end up with doctors playing God (Qāsmī 1994, pp. 191–95). Others 
argue that the ultimate dignity of the human being is to deposit the decedent’s body into the earth. If 
organ transplantation is allowed, there will come a point where potentially every limb, organ, bones, 
and tissues of the human being can be put to manufacture mundane things like bags and soap with 
nothing to bury in the grave (Mawdūdī cited in Al-Sanbhālī 1987, p. 54). The legalisation of organ 
donation will thus ultimately result in a situation where the entire human corpse is put to use with 
nothing to bury. 
4.6. Cultural Imperialism 
An alternative argument against organ transplantation comes from the Moroccan Scholar 
ʿAbdullāh bin Ṣiddīq al-Ghumārī (d. 1993). Where al-Shaʿrāwī emphasised how organ 
transplantation encroaches on God’s sovereignty and Shafīʿ argued against human exploitation, for 
al-Ghumārī the issue boils down to cultural superiority. Al-Ghumārī sees in permitting organ 
transplantation a self-fulfilling prophecy of the Prophet Muhammad. Al-Ghumārī writes, 
Organ transplantation is something which is prevalent among European doctors and 
Muslim doctors followed them suit. This is a grave mistake because the religion of Islam 
honours the dead. … However, people hasten to blindly follow the Christians in everything 
that comes from them bringing to truth the saying of the Prophet, “You will blindly follow 
the ways of the previous communities span by span, cubit by cubit” (Al-Ghumārī 2007). 
Some Egyptian scholars and the public also viewed invasive technological advancements as a 
way of Westernisation and individualisation of Egyptian society and an erosion of traditional, 
religious and cultural values (Hamdy 2008, 2012). Al-Sukkarī argues that many of the new 
technological and medical progresses which have seeped into Muslim culture were manufactured by 
non-Muslims who have no understanding of Islamic principles and ethics, these include narcotics in 
medicine, organ transplantation, gender reassignment surgery, surrogacy, IVF treatment, milk banks, 
sperm banks and determining the sex of the foetus. Al-Sukkarī argues that since these advancements 
were not developed by Muslims, they lack an infusion of Islamic ethics, which renders them 
impermissible (Al-Sukkarī 1988, p. 121). Hamdy argues that to view the debate as a clash of 
civilisation is a misdiagnosis of the issue. Hamdy contends that as long as the issue remains 
misdiagnosed, legitimate worries about the exploitation of marginalised patients will remain 
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unaddressed, which will further impede the establishment of a national transplant programme 
(Hamdy 2013, p. 149). 
The forgoing was a discussion of the major arguments and evidence provided by the proponents 
of position one. There are other arguments associated with this position which include the body or 
soul feeling pain during organ procurement from a cadaver donor, anxiety over being resurrected 
with a missing organ or limb in front of God, negative traits of the donor being passed on to the 
recipient through transplantation especially from a non-Muslim and the question of whether an 
organ renders impure once separated from the body and its ramifications on the recipient vis-à-vis 
performing acts of worship in this state. Unfortunately, space does not allow us to elaborate on all of 
these points. 
5. Position 2: Organ Reception and Donation are both Permissible 
Organ transplantation surgery is routine practice today throughout the world. The procedure is 
viewed as one of the best technological advancements for the betterment of society. Proponents of 
the second position conform to this understand and have declared both organ reception and donation 
to be permissible in all iterations, living and dead, determined through circulatory and/or 
neurological criteria, with certain caveats. This is the opinion of the Islamic Organisation for Medical 
Sciences (IOMS)3 of Kuwait which arrived at a resolution in its second conference on the topic of 
beginning and end of life in Islam in 1985 (IOMS 1985, cited in IIFA). This was followed by the 
resolution arrived at by the International Islamic Fiqh Academy (IIFA) of Jeddah in its 3rd conference 
held in Amman, Jordan in 1986 (IIFA 1986) and again in 1988 in its 4th session in Jeddah where death 
determined through neurological criteria was deemed as Islamic death (IIFA 1988). It is also the 
opinion of eminent Muslim scholars such as the former rector of Al-Azhar University Sayyid al-
Ṭanṭāwī (d. 2010) (Hamdy 2012, p. 48), Yūsuf Al-Qaraḍāwī (2009) and Khālid Ṣayfullāh Raḥmānī 
(2010). A similar fatwa was issued by Zaki Badawi in the UK in 1995 (which is being used by the NHS) 
(Badawi 1995). The resolution is also that of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), which 
was declared in the 6th session in 2000 and is the opinion which is becoming the most popular in the 
Muslim world as transplant medicine advances and people become more aware of the need of and 
benefits for transplantation (ECFR 2000; Islamic Religious Council of Singapore 2015; The Ministry 
of Health Malaysia 2011). 
As previously mentioned, the issue of organ transplantation falls within the domain of legal 
discretion (ijtihād) since there is nothing clear cut in Muslim scripture on the topic. Despite this, 
proponents of position two believe that the spirit of the Qur’an and hadith is conducive to organ 
transplantation and donation. These scholars arrive at this decision by joining numerous disparate 
themes found in the Qur’an and hadith together. These include the necessity to save one’s life, the 
exhortation to save another’s life, human dignity and honour, and charity. 
5.1. Organ Reception 
The justification for receiving an organ in a life-threatening or life-enhancing situation is easily 
justifiable from multiple Qur’anic verses permitting the consumption of prohibited (ḥarām) 
ingredients in dire necessity. A typical example of such verses is found in the second chapter of the 
Qur’an, 
He has only forbidden you carrion, blood, pig’s meat, and animals over which any name 
other than God’s has been invoked. However, if anyone is forced to eat such things by 
hunger, rather than desire or excess, he commits no sin: God is most merciful and forgiving’ 
(Q. 2:173). 
                                                 
 
3 IOMS: Islamic Organisation for Medical Sciences (of Kuwait), al-Munaẓẓama al-Islāmiyya li al-ʿUlu ̄m al-
Ṭibbiyya 
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While opponents of organ transplantation circumscribe this verse to food products only, the 
proponents find no reason not to extend it to all cases of dire necessity (Al-Yaḥyāwī 2016, p. 153). 
Hence, the proponents argue that such verses also extend to medical treatment using prohibited 
ingredients and methods (Al-Yaʿqūbī 1987). This is further exemplified through an incident involving 
one of the companions of the Prophet. ʿArfaja severely injured his nose in a battle. Per Arab medical 
practice at the time, he made a mould out of silver and fixed it in the place of his nose. After a while, 
it started to become putrid and the Prophet permitted him to make a mould out of Gold (Abū Dāwūd, 
bāb mā jāʾ fī rabṭ al-asnān bi al-dhahab, cited in Al-Bassām 2003). Gold is a prohibited item of jewellery 
for men, but the Prophet allowed it for ʿ Arfaja due to his particular circumstance. Such guidance from 
the Qur’an and prophetic practice are further enshrined as legal maxims to facilitate scholars in 
arriving at decisions where the scripture is conspicuously silent such as: necessity permits the 
prohibited, hardship facilitates ease, needs (ḥāja) shares the same legal ruling of necessity (Abū Zayd 
1988). 
5.2. Organ Donation 
Where the justification for receiving an organ is easily demonstrated from the Qur’an and hadith, 
the same cannot be said for organ donation. Here, the scholars employ numerous unrelated pieces of 
evidence organised logically, allowing them to arrive at the conclusion that organ donation is 
permissible. The first of these is the above verse read in tandem with the verse, ‘Do not contribute to 
your destruction with your own hands’ (Q. 2:195). These scholars argue that while it is necessary for 
a person in trouble to save themselves, it is a duty for others to facilitate this saving lest it results in 
the troubled person perishing. This is a collective duty (fard ̣ kifāya) where everyone will be sinful if 
no one carries it out (Al-Qarad ̣āwī 2009, p. 38). Furthermore, to save a life is one of the objectives of 
the Shariah which the Qur’an equates to saving the entire human race, ‘If anyone saves a life, it is as 
if he saves the lives of all mankind’ (Q. 5:32). Al-Qaraḍāwī, quotes the saying of the Prophet, 
‘Whoever can benefit his brother, he should’ (Ṣah ̣īḥ Muslim, bāb al-salām) and the second Caliph 
Umar’s recommendation to Muḥammad Ibn Maslama, ‘If you have a thing which will benefit your 
brother and not harm you, why do you resist using it?’ (Muwaṭṭā Mālik, kitāb al-aqḍiya cited in Al-
Qarad ̣āwī 2009, p. 44). 
The issue of charity and altruism have been invoked as further evidence and encouragement for 
organ donation. ‘They give them preference over themselves, even if they too are poor: those who 
are saved from their own souls’ greed are truly successful,’ the Qur’an reads (Q. 59:9). This verse has 
led to the justification of numerous actions which otherwise would have been prohibited such as a 
bystander putting themselves in way of danger to protect a drowning person or a burning person 
(Qabbānī 2003, pp. 64–65). 
5.3. The Greater-Good and Lesser-of-Two-Evils Argument 
One of the main arguments put forward by proponents of organ donation is that the net benefit 
of organ donation to the recipient outweighs the gross harm incurred on the donor. These scholars 
argue that there is no such thing as absolute benefit or absolute harm but a mixture of the two 
(Qabbānī 2003, p. 63). The legal ruling of permissibility or impermissibility will follow the 
preponderance of benefit or harm in any situation respectively. To illustrate this point, proponents 
use two precedent cases from medieval Islamic legal literature. The case of a deceased pregnant 
woman, where there is a high probability that the baby in her womb is alive; and the deceased, who 
had devoured someone else’s wealth and died. All of the schools of thought are of the opinion that if 
a pregnant woman dies and her baby is still alive in the womb and a high probability that the child 
will remain alive at the moment of extraction, it is permissible to open her womb and save the baby 
(Al-Yaʿqūbī 1987, pp. 80–88). 
The ḥanafīs argue that if it is known for sure that the baby will live, it is obligatory to open the 
womb, otherwise it is permissible. An opinion from Mālik and the position of the ḥanbalī school is 
that it is not permissible to cut open the deceased’s womb. A closer look at ḥanbalī argument reveals 
that they believed, given the state of technology at that time, that it is never possible to save the child 
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in such a situation—as a result of which, violating the corpse is futile (Al-Yaʿqūbī 1987, p. 60). Ibn 
Qudāmah writes, ‘according to us (ḥanbalīs), it cannot be established whether the child is alive or 
not, even then, the child normally does not survive. Hence, it is not permissible to violate the real 
dignity of the deceased for a doubtful (mawhūm) matter (Ibn Qudāmah cited in Al-Yaʿqūbī 1987, p. 
60). Similar to the above, all schools of thought agree that when a person swallows another person’s 
possession, such as jewellery, and then dies, it is permissible to exhume the corpse and extract the 
valuable by cutting open the abdomen (Al-Yaʿqūbī 1987, pp. 80–88). 
Proving the permissibility of organ donation is difficult based on the above points as they 
provide no explicit evidence that organ donation is permissible. Nevertheless, the point was to 
demonstrate that the dignity of the dead is not absolute (Al-Būṭī 1988, p. 197). Muslim scholars have 
allowed dignity to be violated to a degree for the sake of achieving a greater good. In the case of the 
deceased woman, preservation of a new life surpasses the dignity of the mother’s corpse. Similarly, 
the fact that the deceased swallowed someone else’s wealth, they have automatically forfeited their 
right to bodily integrity. In both these cases, the principles of preservation of life and preservation of 
wealth are at play. Both of these are viewed as greater benefits than the harm caused to the deceased. 
Advocates of the second position extend the same analogy to organ donation. Advocates argue that 
while there is minimal harm to a living donor (which is arrived at after thorough medical check-up), 
and hardly any harm to the dead donor, the benefit it brings to the recipient is life saving or life 
enhancing. However, does mere necessity warrant violation of the dignity of the donor, dead or alive? 
Do the donors have a right over their bodies? Does God have a right over the body of the donor? 
Proponents of this position are aware of these questions and retort that the donor voluntarily 
forfeits their right over their bodies through their consent (Al-Qaradāghī 2011, p. 55). Without the 
consent of the donor, procuring their organs is not permissible irrespective of the life-threatening 
effect that it will have on the recipient. However, what about God’s right? Since God has a claim over 
the human body, can the donor make that choice on behalf of God? ʿĀrif Al-Qaradāghī provides a 
formula for knowing whether God sanctions an action or not (in the absence of clear instructions 
from Him). Al-Qaradāghī posits that God is good and ultimately does things for the betterment of 
people. If by comparing the harm and benefit of an action, the net harm is greater than its benefit, 
then God’s consent ceases to exist in that thing and it is deemed to be prohibited. However, if the net 
benefit preponderates the harm, then it can be assumed that God is happy to sanction this action (Al-
Qaradāghī 2011, p. 55). If the harm to the donor is greater than the benefit to the recipient, for example 
as a result of donation the donor falls terminally ill, then organ donation is not permissible. 
Conversely, if the donated organ saves the life of the recipient or restores a basic function of the body 
with minimal harm to the donor then organ donation is permissible. The benefits incurred from a 
living donor, although lifesaving, is still less compared to the benefit gained from a cadaver donor. 
This imbalance is because, in a live donation, only organs which do not lethally harm the donor are 
donated, such as one kidney, blood and some tissues. However, restricting donations to living 
donations alone only reduces the pool of organs available for transplant. All vital organs need to 
come from cadaver donors. However, what is death and for the purpose of organ donation, how is 
death to be understood? 
5.4. Death and Organ Donation 
Death is understood as the ‘the irreversible loss of that which is essentially significant to its 
nature’ (Veatch and Ross 2015, p. 54). To put it another way, at what point can death-related activities 
such as the distribution of inheritance and preparation of burial be enacted? In Islam, death translates 
to the exiting of the soul from the human body (Encyclopedia of Islamic Jurisprudence 1988–2006, 39:248). 
The Qur’an describes this phenomenon in the following verse, ‘He is the Supreme Master over His 
subjects. He sends out guardians to watch over you until, when death overtakes any of you, those 
sent by Us take his soul—they never fail in their duty (Q. 6:61).’ Death from this point of view is a 
metaphysical phenomenon which cannot be empirically verified. Nevertheless, medieval Muslim 
scholars associated the flowing of essential fluids (blood and breath) in the body with the presence 
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of the soul and its loss with its exit. When in doubt, they opted for putrefaction, to leave the body 
until the stench of rotting flesh can be smelt (Ibn ʿĀbidīn 1992, 2:193). 
This is the common-sense understanding of death. In other words, certain physical criteria were 
observed as an indicator of the exiting of the soul. Two words are normally associated with the word 
‘soul’, ‘rūḥ’ and ‘nafs’. The word ‘rūḥ’, when referred to as a material disembodied body, is translated 
as ‘spirit’. There is only one occasion in the Qur’an (Q. 17:85) where the word ‘rūḥ’ can possibly refer 
to the human soul and most commentators believed it to be so. ‘[Prophet], they ask you about the 
rūḥ. Say, ‘The rūḥ is an order (ʾamr) of my Lord. You have only been given a little knowledge.’ (Q. 
17:85). If this is the case, then per Qur’anic instruction, it is not possible to define what the soul/rūh ̣ 
is. However, a linguistic concordance analysis reveals that every instance of the usage of the word 
‘rūh ̣’ in the Qur’an either refers to the angel Gabriel, or Jesus Christ, or revelation, or the Spirit that 
God breathed into Adam’s mould. In fact, in addition to Q. 17:85, there are two other verses where 
the word ‘ʾamr’ is associated with the word ‘rūḥ’ and in both these verses, the word ‘rūḥ’ either refers 
to the angel Gabriel (Q. 42:52) or revelation itself (Q. 40:15). 
What the above analysis reveals is that it is highly unlikely that the word ‘rūḥ’ in Q. 17:85 is 
referring to the ‘human soul’ which one can never know. On the other hand, the word ‘nafs’ has 
multiple meanings in the Qur’an, and its translation as ‘soul’ is not contextually appropriate in all its 
usage in the Qur’an (Sachedina 2011, p. 148). Thus, it refers to the: self (Q. 2:9), human being (Q. 2:72), 
life (Q. 2:155), reflective pronoun (Q. 2:187), inner disposition (Q. 2: 235), soul (Q. 3:185), spirit (Q. 
4:1), evil self (Q. 5:30), exiting of the soul (Q. 6:93), extraction of the soul at the time of death (Q. 39:42), 
self-reproaching soul (Q. 75:2), and the content-soul returning to God (Q. 89:27). The different usage 
of the word ‘nafs’ reveals that it does not only refer to the ‘soul’ but as the human as an integrated 
being involving, physical life, psychological disposition with its evil thoughts and self-reproach and 
the spiritual soul which returns to God (Sachedina 2011, p. 148). This integrated capacity of 
personhood, viewed as a vital force, makes a human a human and its absence is deemed as the onset 
of death. 
5.5. Organ Donation and Death Determined through Neurological Criteria 
While death determined through circulatory criteria is what corresponds with a common-sense 
understanding of death, organs retrieved through such determination of death are not always prime. 
This is due to the gradual destruction of the organ’s cells as a result of oxygen deprivation. 
Technological advancement in intensive care techniques gave birth to the brain-based concept of 
death towards the end of the 19th century (Machado et al. 2007, p. 197). The concept merged with 
organ transplantation after the publication of the ‘Harvard Ad Hoc Committee report in 1968 entitled 
‘A Definition of Irreversible Coma’ (Veatch and Ross 2015, p. 52; Machado et al. 2007, p. 198). 
Henceforth, the success of transplant improved with the refinement and development of the brain-
based death concept (Machado et al. 2007, p. 198). Organ retrieval from brain-dead patients became 
the major and primary source of organs due to their quality as a result of the decedent being 
artificially ventilated and perfused. Advocates of whole brain death (USA) or brain stem death (UK) 
believe that irreversible loss of vital brain functions is akin to the death of the organism. It should be 
understood that such criteria for death are unprecedented in human history. Prior to the invention of 
life-support machines, this situation would not have arisen. A terminal and lethal injury to the brain 
would have meant all vital functions of the body including breathing and heartbeat would have 
ceased. Death determined using neurological criteria was only possible because of such ‘new death-
assaulting technologies’ (Veatch and Ross 2015, p. 53). 
The clinical diagnosis of brain death as actual death is more or less standard practice all around 
the world although there are disparities in how one arrives at this diagnosis (Veatch and Ross 2015, 
pp. 52–63). Muslim scholars like al-Ṭanṭāwī argued that determining the onset of death falls outside 
of the jurisdiction of Islamic scholars, and that physicians have full authority over this matter (Hamdy 
2012, p. 48). In 1985, the IOMS in Kuwait recognised brain death as Islamic death. And the declaration 
of the IIFA in 1986 and 1988 led to transplantation centres opening up in Saudi Arabia. However, 
how did these scholars arrive at the decision that brain-based death is actual death? 
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5.6. The Rūḥ, the Brain and Death 
As we have mentioned above, the soul is not an unknown entity that cannot be tracked. For 
scholars of position two, the soul is the vital force that animates the human being. Medieval Muslim 
scholars also recognised this function of the soul. Ibn al-Qayyim al-Jawziyya (d. 1350), the 14th-
century h ̣anbalī scholar of Damascus, asks what the constituent parts of the rūḥ/soul is made up of. 
Is it the sum of disparate human body parts; is it soul and body; is it a combination of the four 
humours or is it the circulation of blood? He asks if it is the soul that ascends to the brain; or is it a 
subtle matter which is born on the left side of the heart and circulates around the body through the 
veins or if it is an integral part of the heart (Al-Jawziyya 2011, p. 520) 520. Ibn al-Qayyim opts for the 
definition that, 
It is a living, animated, subtle, heavenly illuminated mass (jism nūrānī ʿulwī ḥayy khafīf 
mutaḥarrik) which permeates the essence of the organs and circulates in them like the way 
water flows in a rose or oil in the olive or fire in the coal (Al-Jawziyya 2011, p. 521). 
He argues that as long as the body parts are capable of being influenced by this subtle mass, the 
latter remains integrated with the organs and it benefits the organs with sensations and voluntary 
movement. However, when the organs are destroyed because of the overpowering of a foreign object 
and are no longer capable of accepting the effects of the rūḥ, this is an indication that the rūḥ has 
departed and passed on to the realm of the soul. 
For advocates of the second position, the above description of the soul’s integrated functionality 
with the body corresponds with the brain’s integrated relationship with the body. An irreversible 
loss of the brain’s vital functions, for the advocates, is an indication that the soul has moved on and 
the person is no more. This soul–brain–body relationship did not go uncontested. For advocates of 
the next position, the brain-death criteria throw up more problems than it can solve (see Padela and 
Basser 2012 for a detailed exploration of these issues). 
6. Position 3: Organ Retrieval after Brain Death Not Allowed 
While advocates of this position allow organ reception and donations from living and 
circulatory-death patients, they have serious reservations when it comes to allowing organs to be 
retrieved when the death of the donor was determined using neurological criteria. For these scholars, 
it creates a peculiar situation—a betwixt and between position—where the patient is dead from one 
perspective and yet has signs of the living from another such as warmth, a heartbeat and breathing. 
Some argue that the prognosis of death has been confused with its diagnosis, and the death of the 
organism is being conflated with the death of an organ. The fact that certain somatic activities such 
as breathing, albeit mechanically, is present, is an indication of the presence of the soul in the body. 
Termination of life at that moment is tantamount to killing a dying yet living human being. 
Numerous high profile scholars hold this view including the former grand muftī of Egypt and 
one-time rector of al-Azhar, Gād al-Haqq ʿAlī Gād al-Haqq (d. 1996) (1979); the Syrian scholar 
Muḥammad Saʿīd Ramaḍān al-Būṭī (d. 2013) (1988) and the opinion of another former grand muftī of 
Egypt, Ali Gomaa Mohammed (2003). This position is also taken by the author of the latest 
independent fatwa commissioned by the NHS, Muhammad Zubair Butt (2019). 
While an international conference convened by the Islamic Fiqh Council (IFC) of Mecca in 1985 
declared cadaver organ retrieval to be permissible, it did not deal with the thorny issue of organ 
procurement from brain-dead patients (IFC 2003). In a later, unrelated conference held on October 
1987 deliberating on the legal status of removing artificial ventilation machine from a brain-dead 
patient, the conference resolved that while it is permissible for doctors to switch off the life-support 
machine in such a situation, the person will not be declared Islamically dead until complete cessation 
of heartbeat and breathing has not taken place (IFC 2010, p. 231). This latter decision, although not 
directly related to the organ retrieval process must be read in tandem with the former cadaver organ 
donation position. 
The issue of brain-dead organ retrieval is a deadlock situation borne out of competing 
worldviews and ontological understandings of what a human being is. While advocates of position 
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two associate the soul and death with vital brain functions, proponents of the third position opt for a 
more traditional understanding of death, the complete cessation of vital fluids (breathing and 
circulation of blood). Al-Būṭī calls this the common understanding of death which everyone 
recognises. In his conference discussion, al-Būṭī mentions that he does not dispute the medical 
diagnosis of death but argues that death is a single occasion which is understood by all and not just 
the elite doctors. Al-Būṭī’s barometer for ascertaining death is not a highly trained surgeon, but the 
common man. Death is what the average person understands it to be. Al-Būṭī writes, 
Death is “the complete separation of the soul from the body”, or to put it differently for 
those who do not recognise the soul, “it is the complete cessation of life from the body.” We 
do not think that there is anyone who will disagree with this understanding of death (Al-
Būṭī 1988, pp. 205–6). 
For al-Būṭī, the only Islamically reliable indicator for the onset of death is the weakening of the 
pulse and the cessation of heartbeat. One can argue that this is not a correct Islamic indicator of death, 
since there is no association of the departure of the soul with the cessation of heartbeat in Muslim 
scripture. Al-Būṭī further argues that using the legal tool ‘presumption of continuity’ (istiṣḥāb al-aṣl), 
the continuity of the life of the imminently dying person is certain while depending on which criteria 
one uses to diagnose death, his death is uncertain. The certainty of life cannot be removed by the 
uncertainty of death determination using neurological criteria. For al-Būṭī, as long as the heartbeat 
remains, even if artificially, the person is alive and no declaration of death can be pronounced (Al-
Būṭī 1988, p. 208). 
Finally, a quick word must be said about the recent NHS Fatwa on organ donation. While it is 
clear that the author, Zubair Butt, does not support a brain-based diagnosis of death, his position on 
circulatory death can easily be misunderstood. At first glance, it seems that Butt is a supporter of 
organ retrieval from circulatory death patients. However, on closer look, Butt is much more 
restrictive than what appears to be the case. Butt introduces two concepts into his position, concepts 
which are not a part of the Islamic discourse but taken from secular bioethicists such as Don Marquis, 
Miller and Troug (Veatch and Ross 2015, p. 44; Butt 2019, pp. 99–102). These two terms are 
‘permanence’ and ‘irreversibility’. ‘Permanence’ is the irreversible loss of circulatory functions due 
to legal or moral reasons, for example, the decedent willed not to be resuscitated after cardiac arrest 
even if it is medically possible to do so. ‘Irreversibility’ is what is known as medical or biological 
irreversibility; the point at which no amount of medical intervention will kick start the heart. Butt 
writes, 
“While contemporary Muslim scholars have recognised cardiorespiratory arrest as a 
reliable sign of departure of the soul, they have also required it to be irreversible. This 
stipulation of irreversibility is to ensure that the soul has indeed departed and, while this 
stipulation is a recent introduction to the definition of death, it is arguable that it was always 
implied but had to be expressly stated only because we decided we would interfere with 
the body of the dying/deceased. Thus, DDCD (donation from circulatory death) is not 
permissible until the point of elective irreversibility has lapsed” (Butt 2019, p. 100). 
On the above basis, for Butt, only tissue donation and cornea donation from the deceased are 
allowed as these are possible to retrieve after the point of elective irreversibility has elapsed. 
Variations to the 3rd Position 
Some scholars advocated a third position between the living and dead, which they called al-ḥayy 
fī ḥukm al-mayyit, living but legally dead (Al-Ashqar 1987, p. 671). This was the opinion of the late 
Jordanian scholar Muḥammad Sulaymān al-Ashqar (d. 2009) who argued that from one perspective 
we can treat a brain-dead person living and therefore some of the rules of the living will apply to 
him, for example, the distribution of his wealth to his inheritors and his wife sitting in for the ʿidda 
period will only take place after complete cardiac arrest has taken place. However, from another 
Religions 2020, 11, 99 15 of 22 
 
angle, we may deem him to be dead and therefore treat him as we treat the dead, and therefore his 
organs can be procured and treatment can be withdrawn. 
Precedents in Islamic law manuals exist for similar types of deaths where a person has somatic 
activity but is yet declared to be legally dead. Scholars discuss the case of the movement of a ‘slain 
person’ (madhbūḥ) who still has some semblance of biological life and yet for legal reasons declare 
him to be dead. Thus, these scholars argue that if the slain person’s father was to die after him, the 
slain person will not inherit anything from him, for he is legally dead and the deceased do not inherit 
(Al-Ṭaḥṭāwī 1997, p. 597; Al-Ashqar 1987, p. 668). Unfortunately, al-Ashqar did not develop his ideas 
further—as a result of which, we do not know what criteria are being used to say the person is dead 
in respect of this law and alive in respect of that. 
7. Position 4: Higher Brain Functioning and Organ Retrieval 
Dr Rafaqat Rashid, a Muslim scholar and medical doctor from the UK, moves the debate 
concerning death to a slightly earlier time. Rashid argues that death is the permanent loss of capacity 
of higher brain functioning including the cessation of volition, sentience, and voluntary action. This 
is when the rational soul has permanently lost its capacity of control of the critical human and rational 
components of the body. Rashid views the functions of the soul described by Ibn al-Qayyim al-
Jawziyya above and other scholars like al-Ghazali as the soul’s control over most of the conscious 
activities which also resembles the cerebral cortex’s higher brain functions (Rashid forthcoming 19; 
Veatch and Ross 2015, pp. 88–100). Al-Ghazali argues that the soul is the primary integrator of the 
entire body’s functions and its departure is equivalent to the collapse of this integrated bodily 
functioning. This is exactly the function of the brain or more specifically the cerebral cortex vis-à-vis 
the body. 
However, are there any criteria that will ascertain the permanent loss of higher brain 
functioning? Rashid accepts that while the cerebral cortex is the nearest instrument and implement 
of the rational soul, it is impossible to draw a clear distinction between a sentient person and a 
sentient non-person. Rashid concedes that in the absence of a universal accurate anatomical criterion 
for a higher brain formulation of death, the brain-stem death criteria should be the closest and most 
accurate one to employ (Rashid forthcoming 27). This understanding of the relationship between the 
higher brain functioning, the soul and the body leads Rashid to conclude that legally (Islamically) it 
will be permissible to retrieve the organs of a donor at this point. Rashid argues that the phenomenon 
of declaring someone dead is not the domain of philosophy, metaphysics or theology but falls 
squarely within the realms of Islamic law. He arrives at this conclusion through a careful reading of 
some paradigm cases found in the classical Islamic law manuals. By way of example, the classical 
Islamic law manuals state that the punishment of qisās (retribution for murder) can be meted out to a 
person who slit someone else’s throat on the basis that the victim has lost all sentience, volition, sight, 
speech and voluntary movements permanently as long as that attack leads to the irreversible loss all 
voluntary and involuntary movements (Rashid forthcoming 23). While Rashid accepts that it is 
permissible to retrieve organs at this point, no jurisdiction in the world allows organ retrieval based 
on permanent loss of higher brain functioning (Veatch and Ross 2015, p. 98). The following two 
positions are slight variations of positions 1–3. We will mention them briefly to capture an accurate 
picture of the range of opinions available. 
8. Position 5: Donation only Allowed from Living Donors 
Proponents of the fifth position maintain that although receiving an organ is permitted, donating 
an organ only while alive is permissible. Post-mortem donation is not permissible. This opinion is 
held by a sizeable number of scholars from the Indian subcontinent and is also the resolution of the 
Indian Islamic Fiqh Academy held in 1989 (Raḥmānī 2010, 5:59). 
Scholars advocating this position agree with the scholars of position one as far as it relates to the 
dignity afforded to the dead. Proponents of this position argue that the dead have sacrality (ḥurma), 
which demands that they are deposited in the state they died in. Any intervention is an affront to the 
dignity of the deceased and therefore impermissible. This group of scholars further erroneously 
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argue that since live organ donation fulfils the requirements of saving a life, turning to the dead is 
not necessary. Obviously, scholars from this group are not aware that their view seriously reduces 
the pool of organs available for donation to the non-vital organs only such as blood, bone marrow 
and certain tissues. 
9. Position 6: Donation only Allowed from Cadaver Donors 
The sixth opinion inverses the fifth position. Receiving an organ is permissible but only for 
donations that are to be made post-mortem and not by a living donor. This opinion is held by Aḥmad 
Fahmī Abū Sunna (d. 2003) from the Islamic Fiqh Council of Mecca (Abū Sunna 2003) and 
Muhammad ʿAbd al-Raḥmān, former grand muftī of Cameroon (ʿAbdurRaḥmān 1988). Their 
arguments for receiving and donating organs are exactly the same as position two. Nevertheless, they 
restrict the procurement of organs from only cadavers and not the living. 
However, for donating an organ, proponents of position six invoke legal maxims such as, ‘in the 
presence of two harms the least harmful must be chosen’, as well as the maxim ‘a minor harm is 
tolerated for the sake of a major gain’. Such maxims lead to the conclusion that only post-mortem 
organ donation is permissible. The argument uses the following logic: retrieving an organ from a 
cadaver infringes on the dignity of the deceased. The deceased has certain rights which must be 
protected. These include the right to bodily integrity, the right to a proper bathing, shrouding and a 
quick burial. Violating any of these rights are deemed as harming the deceased. However, this harm 
is lower and more tolerable than the harm of the loss of a life which could have been saved. For 
advocates of this position, the harm inflicted on the cadaver will be tolerated and its dignity infringed 
for the sake of a higher purpose, i.e., saving the life of a dying person. 
In contrast, however, Abū Sunna argues that the living has a right to a healthy life which is 
mandated by the Shariah and the potential donor does not have the autonomy to violate this right. 
Abū Sunna believes that giving away a non-vital solid organ will eventually lead to the donor falling 
ill and cause further health complications. In this instance, there are two harms involved and a 
benefit. The harm inflicted on a healthy person, which will inevitably lead to his destruction as 
opposed to the harm faced by the person in need of the organ (which may lead to his death) and the 
benefit of a longer life should they receive an organ. Abū Sunna believes that the harm that will be 
inflicted on the healthy living being will be greater than the harm already faced by the dying human 
being. Therefore, in this situation, the harm trumps the benefit and, therefore, a live donation is not 
permissible. 
A close reading of Abū Sunna’s arguments reveals that his position is contingent upon a 
particular understanding of the state of transplant medicine in the Muslim world at the time of his 
writing the paper, knowledge which he views as tentative medical knowledge. The advancements of 
transplant medicine, however, are overlooked. Critically engaging with Abū Sunna’s beliefs may lead 
to an alternative perspective on live organ donation. Furthermore, Abū Sunna’s view rests on medical 
knowledge being tentative. However, should a greater degree of success and quality of health be 
assured for both the donor and the recipient, Abū Sunna’s view would need to be revisited. 
10. Position 7: Suspended Judgment 
A seventh position suspends judgment on the issue until further investigation. This opinion is 
held by the Pakistani scholar Muḥammad Ṭaqī ʿUthmānī, son of Muḥammad Shafīʿ. Despite his non-
committed view, ʿUthmānī allows people to take benefit from one of the permissive fatwas should a 
person require to do so (ʿUthmānī [1998] 2011; Al-Kawthari 2004). 
There is a slight variation of the seventh position which is popular among some Muslims, but 
no serious scholar has entertained it. This opinion suggests that it is permissible to receive an organ 
due to necessity but not to donate one because the necessity cannot be extended beyond one’s self. 
The opinion is based on a narrow and individualistic understanding of ‘necessity’. We have argued 
above (in position two) that necessity is a two-way process. Where a person is allowed to eat/utilize 
forbidden objects in order to save himself from destruction, it is equally a collective obligation (farḍ 
kifāya) on others to facilitate this for him lest he perishes. Extended to the discussion on organ 
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donation, it would mean that to donate is also a religious duty since it fulfils the religious requirement 
of saving a person from perishing, which is a necessity (see Al-Yaʿqūbī 1987, p. 32 for a fuller 
discussion). 
While this position is legally sound (by way of analogy, one is not required to make a donation 
of wealth if they are able to do so, even though they were once recipients of donation), it is morally 
despised and opens up the Muslim community to vulnerability. It has been exploited by non-Muslim 
politicians as a tool to argue against Muslim integration into European society (Ghaly 2012b). The 
Netherlands’ media portrayed Muslims as a group that donated less than the national average and 
mentioned the religion of Islam itself as the main cause for the lack of donors. On the contrary, 
Muslims in the Netherlands were found not to deviate from the average national standpoint (Zwart 
and Hoffer 1998). 
11. Conclusions 
In the above detailed exploration of the seven positions, we demonstrated that the topic of organ 
transplantation is not a simple right (ḥalāl) or wrong (ḥarām) answer. The matter, from an Islamic 
point of view, is ijtihādī and, therefore, people are at liberty to choose whichever position suits their 
culture and belief systems. The absence of any mention of organ transplantation in the Islamic sources 
creates a space for exploring numerous options. These options are derived from a particular 
understanding of broader issues related to life, death, attitude towards the dead and society and one’s 
approach to scripture and understanding Islamic law. What really is at play here is the tension 
between two competing objectives of the Shariah: the right to preservation of religion and the right 
to preservation of life (Opwis 2017). Those who do not allow organ transplantation do so because 
they believe that it violates the dictates of the Shariah vis-à-vis God’s autonomy over his property, 
the dignity that Islam affords humans, the right to bodily integrity and the right not to be killed or be 
used as a means to an end. Conversely, the proponents of organ transplantation argue that the right 
to preservation of life is a weightier objective of the Shariah than the preservation of religion. 
Preservation of life is weightier because while one can express non-belief in dire necessity, there is no 
such substitute for life. 
Thus, the proponents of position one focus more on the state of the donor and bodily integrity. 
More specifically for the South Asian Deobandi and Barelwi scholars discussed above, bodily 
intervention is not a civil transaction (muʿāmala) bound by meaning and context where society can 
negotiate the best course of action. For them, the body is sacred and leaving it intact is a devotional 
imperative (ʾamr taʿabbudī)—the rules of which will remain unchanged in perpetuity (Moosa 1998, p. 
306). Furthermore, the body is the site of religious, social and cultural identity and order. With respect 
to protecting society from social disorder, society has always exercised an element of control over the 
body most saliently through its purity laws (Douglas 2001). Moosa writes: 
The religious concern about ‘human dignity’ in relation to transplants express anxieties 
about social integrity and the maintenance of social order. Any attempt to ‘dis(em)body’ 
the cadaver through eviscerating surgery, may indeed signify the violation of a symbolic 
and social ‘order’. This may be the cultural subtext that underlines the understanding of the 
Pakistani jurists (Moosa 1998, p. 305). 
In contrast to the above scholars, advocates of the second position privilege the need of the 
recipient over the sanctity of the donor. For them, death and the soul are an empirical phenomenon 
which can be tracked using technology. In contrast, supporters of position one and three view death 
as a natural phenomenon where nature must take its course without any intervention. The soul and 
everything related to it is metaphysical and cannot be monitored through machines. Finally, for 
Rashid (position four), death is a legal phenomenon even if the body shows some semblance of 
biological life. 
Lying beneath the scholarly ethico-legal arguments of the scholars discussed are broader 
assumptions regarding how these scholars view the human body. Bryan Turner (1996) argues that 
there are two ways that people conceptualise their bodies: embodiment and enselvement. When 
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people make a distinction between themselves and their bodies by using phrases like ‘having’ or 
‘possessing’ a body, they are embodying that body. For them, the body is external to themselves 
which they inhabit. In contrast, enselvement is when people identify themselves with their bodies. Is 
the body nothing more than a conglomeration of disparate interchangeable body parts or is it 
integrated with the idea of personhood (see Haddow 2000; Haddow 2005; Haque 2008; and Rashid 
2018 for more on topic of personhood and its place in the organ donation debate)? Studies have 
shown that the more integrated body parts are to the idea of personhood, the more sacred they are 
considered and less likely to be donated. The idea is in part based on how people view their ‘body 
image’ which may not necessarily have any relation to biological facticity but can be influenced by 
history, tradition, religion and custom (Haddow 2000; Ali 2019a). While none of the scholars 
discussed above reject the notion of the soul, it seems that advocates of positions one, three and five 
view the body through the prism of enselvement. For them, donating a body part is akin to donation 
of the self, while scholars of the remaining positions do not confer the same amount of emotional 
attachment to the physical body once death has taken place (see Hamdy 2012, pp. 102–4 for al-
Ṭanṭāwī’s position). 
We have mentioned above that the issue of organ transplantation and donation is an ijtihādī 
issue. On the basis of this, we opted for a legally pluralist approach to the issue. Hopefully, the 
detailed exploration of the different positions will allow people to make theologically informed 
decisions without feeling morally and theologically culpable for their choices. However, it must be 
acknowledged that people have their own understanding of bodily integrity, death and dying. 
Despite religion playing a big role in people’s decision making, it is not the sole arbiter. Deciding to 
become an organ donor is a subjective and complex process involving various factors and prioritising 
values (some of them elaborated in this article). Understanding Muslim viewpoints on organ 
donation requires a thorough understanding of these factors and their importance to Muslims, whose 
decisions, based on these values need to be respected. 
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